Below you can find my PUBLICATIONS, my CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS, and my TALKS.
Publications
forthcoming, Pils, Raimund: Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency, Journal for General Philosophy of Science
This paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological dimension of the scientific realism debate. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. I argue that van Fraassen’s epistemology is not suited to give a justification for a crucial presupposition of his Bad Lot objection to inference to the best explanation (IBE), the presupposition that believing that p is linked to p being more likely to be true. This makes him vulnerable to a counterargument, tailored after Musgrave defense of IBE, which would result in a stalemate between them about presuppositions of rationality. I will, however, show that switching to VTE can justify van Fraassen’s presupposition. This leads to a dismissal of common IBE arguments for realism as presented by Boyd and Musgrave, but I also argue that a more cautious version of realism can be rescued from the Bad Lot objection. Finally, I raise some worries about epistemic risk-attitude consistency for constructive empiricists and develop an alternative anti-realist position.
2023, Schoenegger, Philipp & Pils, Raimund: Social Sciences in Crisis: On the Proposed Elimination of the Discussion Section (Open Access), Synthese
The social sciences are facing numerous crises including those related to replication, theory, and applicability. We highlight that these crises imply epistemic malfunctions and affect science communication negatively. Several potential solutions have already been proposed, ranging from statistical improvements to changes in norms of scientific conduct. In this paper, we propose a structural solution: the elimination of the discussion section from social science research papers. We point out that discussion sections allow for an inappropriate narrativization of research that disguises actual results and enables the misstatement of true limitations. We go on to claim that removing this section and outsourcing it to other publications provides several epistemic advantages such as a division of academic labour, adversarial modes of progress, and a better alignment of the personal aims of scientists with the aims of science. After responding to several objections, we conclude that the potential benefits of moving away from the traditional model of academic papers outweigh the costs and have the potential to play a part in addressing the crises in the social sciences alongside other reforms. As such, we take our paper as proffering a further potential solution that should be applied complimentarily with other reform movements such as Open Science and hope that our paper can start a debate on this or similar proposals.
2022, Pils, Raimund: Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies (Open Access), International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.
2022, Pils, Raimund: A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification (Open Access), Canadian Journal of Philosophy
There is now a significant body of literature on consequentialist ethics that propose satisficing instead of maximizing accounts. Even though epistemology recently witnessed a wide-spread discussion of teleological and consequentialist theories, a satisficing account is surprisingly not developed yet. The aim of this paper is to do just that. The rough idea is that epistemic rules are justified if and only if they satisfice the epistemic good, i.e., reach some threshold of epistemic value (which varies with practical context), and believing is justified if and only if it follows said rules.
I argue that this alternative to the implicitly established way of thinking in maximizing terms has significant advantages.
2021, Pils, Raimund & Schoenegger, Philipp: On the Epistemological Similarities of Market Liberalism and Standpoint Theory (Open Access), Episteme (First view pp. 1-21)
In this paper, we draw attention to the epistemological assumptions of market liberalism and standpoint theory and argue that they have more in common than previously thought. We show that both traditions draw on a similar epistemological bedrock, specifically relating to the fragmentation of knowledge in society and the fact that some of this knowledge cannot easily be shared between agents. We go on to investigate how market liberals and standpoint theorists argue with recourse to these similar foundations, and sometimes diverge, primarily because of normative pre-commitments. One conclusion we draw from this is that these similarities suggest that market liberals ought to, by their own epistemological lights, be more attentive towards various problems raised by feminist standpoint theorists, and feminist standpoint theorists ought to be more open to various claims made by market liberals.
Free access here.
2020, Pils, Raimund: Quine's Scientific Realism Revisited (Open Access), Theoria 86(5), 612-642.
In order to reconnect Quine’s views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine’s scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine’s scientific realism from the late 40s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames’ view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti-realist conceptual scheme instead. I also argue that Quine’s early views on regimentation are incompatible with a strong formulation of semantic realism. Then, I proceed in reconstructing how he becomes a metaphysical and epistemological realist in the mid 50s and argue against the view of Keskinen and Fogelin that interpret Quine as being a metaphysical anti-realist. Contrary to Davidson, I defend the view that he never gave up normative epistemology and really is a proper epistemological realist. Finally, I discuss how he tries to reconcile his realism with his thesis of ontological relativity and how this necessitates the switch to a stronger form of semantic realism.
Free access here.
2019, Pils, Raimund: Ein deterministischer Kosmos? Von der Aristotelischen Physik zur Quantenmechanik [A Deterministic Kosmos? From Aristotelian Physics to Quantum Mechanics], S. M. Bachhiesl, C. Bachhiesl, S. Köchel (ed.), Zufall und Wissenschaft. Weilerswist: Velbrück.
First, this paper is a historical study that covers the scientific history on determinism from medieval Aristotelian physics to Newtonian mechanics. In doing so it shows how at the end of of the 19th century scientists slowly started to be convinced that we live in a deterministic universe. Second, it is a systematic examination whether this conviction was actually warranted, especially given the discovery of chaos systems in the context of the scientific realism debate. Third, it finishes in the 20th century with the developments in quantum mechanics. Here it addresses the underdetermination situation between different interpretations of QM, especially focusing on the indeterministic Copenhagen Interpretation and the deterministic Bohemian Mechanics and asks what we can learn from it for the determinism question.
2018, Pils, Raimund: Unbeobachtbare Entitäten in der Physik: Intuition, Anschaulichkeit und Common Sense [Unobservable Entities in Physics: Intuition, Illustration and Common Sense], S. M. Bachhiesl, C. Bachhiesl, S. Köchel (ed.), Intuition und Wissenschaft. Internationale Perspektiven. Weilerswist: Velbrück, 35-60.
This paper analyzes the conflict between common-sense intuitions and scientific explanations. I start as an illustration with three case studies: heliocentrism, atomism, and quantum mechanics. I review common arguments for there being an unbridgeable gap between common-sense intuitions and scientific explanations and argue that most of those arguments are based on a confusion about the function of reductive explanations or a misunderstanding of mereology. It is indeed possible to selectively bridge the gap. However, I argue further, that in some instances the gap cannot be bridged. This leaves one with two options: (a) a scientific realist option: to at least selectively abandon common sense, (b) a scientific anti-realist option: to at least selectively abandon a realist interpretation of some portions of current physical theories. I conclude with arguments for and against those options.
This paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological dimension of the scientific realism debate. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. I argue that van Fraassen’s epistemology is not suited to give a justification for a crucial presupposition of his Bad Lot objection to inference to the best explanation (IBE), the presupposition that believing that p is linked to p being more likely to be true. This makes him vulnerable to a counterargument, tailored after Musgrave defense of IBE, which would result in a stalemate between them about presuppositions of rationality. I will, however, show that switching to VTE can justify van Fraassen’s presupposition. This leads to a dismissal of common IBE arguments for realism as presented by Boyd and Musgrave, but I also argue that a more cautious version of realism can be rescued from the Bad Lot objection. Finally, I raise some worries about epistemic risk-attitude consistency for constructive empiricists and develop an alternative anti-realist position.
2023, Schoenegger, Philipp & Pils, Raimund: Social Sciences in Crisis: On the Proposed Elimination of the Discussion Section (Open Access), Synthese
The social sciences are facing numerous crises including those related to replication, theory, and applicability. We highlight that these crises imply epistemic malfunctions and affect science communication negatively. Several potential solutions have already been proposed, ranging from statistical improvements to changes in norms of scientific conduct. In this paper, we propose a structural solution: the elimination of the discussion section from social science research papers. We point out that discussion sections allow for an inappropriate narrativization of research that disguises actual results and enables the misstatement of true limitations. We go on to claim that removing this section and outsourcing it to other publications provides several epistemic advantages such as a division of academic labour, adversarial modes of progress, and a better alignment of the personal aims of scientists with the aims of science. After responding to several objections, we conclude that the potential benefits of moving away from the traditional model of academic papers outweigh the costs and have the potential to play a part in addressing the crises in the social sciences alongside other reforms. As such, we take our paper as proffering a further potential solution that should be applied complimentarily with other reform movements such as Open Science and hope that our paper can start a debate on this or similar proposals.
2022, Pils, Raimund: Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies (Open Access), International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.
2022, Pils, Raimund: A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification (Open Access), Canadian Journal of Philosophy
There is now a significant body of literature on consequentialist ethics that propose satisficing instead of maximizing accounts. Even though epistemology recently witnessed a wide-spread discussion of teleological and consequentialist theories, a satisficing account is surprisingly not developed yet. The aim of this paper is to do just that. The rough idea is that epistemic rules are justified if and only if they satisfice the epistemic good, i.e., reach some threshold of epistemic value (which varies with practical context), and believing is justified if and only if it follows said rules.
I argue that this alternative to the implicitly established way of thinking in maximizing terms has significant advantages.
2021, Pils, Raimund & Schoenegger, Philipp: On the Epistemological Similarities of Market Liberalism and Standpoint Theory (Open Access), Episteme (First view pp. 1-21)
In this paper, we draw attention to the epistemological assumptions of market liberalism and standpoint theory and argue that they have more in common than previously thought. We show that both traditions draw on a similar epistemological bedrock, specifically relating to the fragmentation of knowledge in society and the fact that some of this knowledge cannot easily be shared between agents. We go on to investigate how market liberals and standpoint theorists argue with recourse to these similar foundations, and sometimes diverge, primarily because of normative pre-commitments. One conclusion we draw from this is that these similarities suggest that market liberals ought to, by their own epistemological lights, be more attentive towards various problems raised by feminist standpoint theorists, and feminist standpoint theorists ought to be more open to various claims made by market liberals.
Free access here.
2020, Pils, Raimund: Quine's Scientific Realism Revisited (Open Access), Theoria 86(5), 612-642.
In order to reconnect Quine’s views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine’s scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine’s scientific realism from the late 40s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames’ view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti-realist conceptual scheme instead. I also argue that Quine’s early views on regimentation are incompatible with a strong formulation of semantic realism. Then, I proceed in reconstructing how he becomes a metaphysical and epistemological realist in the mid 50s and argue against the view of Keskinen and Fogelin that interpret Quine as being a metaphysical anti-realist. Contrary to Davidson, I defend the view that he never gave up normative epistemology and really is a proper epistemological realist. Finally, I discuss how he tries to reconcile his realism with his thesis of ontological relativity and how this necessitates the switch to a stronger form of semantic realism.
Free access here.
2019, Pils, Raimund: Ein deterministischer Kosmos? Von der Aristotelischen Physik zur Quantenmechanik [A Deterministic Kosmos? From Aristotelian Physics to Quantum Mechanics], S. M. Bachhiesl, C. Bachhiesl, S. Köchel (ed.), Zufall und Wissenschaft. Weilerswist: Velbrück.
First, this paper is a historical study that covers the scientific history on determinism from medieval Aristotelian physics to Newtonian mechanics. In doing so it shows how at the end of of the 19th century scientists slowly started to be convinced that we live in a deterministic universe. Second, it is a systematic examination whether this conviction was actually warranted, especially given the discovery of chaos systems in the context of the scientific realism debate. Third, it finishes in the 20th century with the developments in quantum mechanics. Here it addresses the underdetermination situation between different interpretations of QM, especially focusing on the indeterministic Copenhagen Interpretation and the deterministic Bohemian Mechanics and asks what we can learn from it for the determinism question.
2018, Pils, Raimund: Unbeobachtbare Entitäten in der Physik: Intuition, Anschaulichkeit und Common Sense [Unobservable Entities in Physics: Intuition, Illustration and Common Sense], S. M. Bachhiesl, C. Bachhiesl, S. Köchel (ed.), Intuition und Wissenschaft. Internationale Perspektiven. Weilerswist: Velbrück, 35-60.
This paper analyzes the conflict between common-sense intuitions and scientific explanations. I start as an illustration with three case studies: heliocentrism, atomism, and quantum mechanics. I review common arguments for there being an unbridgeable gap between common-sense intuitions and scientific explanations and argue that most of those arguments are based on a confusion about the function of reductive explanations or a misunderstanding of mereology. It is indeed possible to selectively bridge the gap. However, I argue further, that in some instances the gap cannot be bridged. This leaves one with two options: (a) a scientific realist option: to at least selectively abandon common sense, (b) a scientific anti-realist option: to at least selectively abandon a realist interpretation of some portions of current physical theories. I conclude with arguments for and against those options.
Current Research
Teleological Epistemology and Scientific Realism (PhD Thesis)
I just recently finished my Ph.D project where I connect veritistic teleological epistemology with the epistemological scientific realism debate in philosophy of science. The goal is to break the stalemate of the realism debate. I argue that rival accounts depend largely on implicitly presupposed epistemic standards, which are constituted by a risk-attitude towards the trade-off between believing truth and avoiding error. The unshakable commitment to one’s risk attitude then explains the reoccurring stalemate of the debate. Subsequently, I employ three strategies to break the stalemate from the perspective of veritistic teleological epistemology, proposing some modifications to versions of classical realism (e.g. Boyd, Musgrave) and anti-realism (especially van Fraassen) as a response to moving the debate forward. I develop a new anti-realist position, and draw important consequences for various versions of selective realism. I conclude with an emergence of a kind of voluntarism that grows out of the proposed epistemological analysis of the realism debate.
Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, Epistemic Risk, and the Bad Lot (under review)
This paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological scientific realism debate in philosophy of science. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. Even though this suggest a liberal attitude towards stance choice (voluntarism), some arguments in the realism debate contradict VTE altogether. First, I show a problem with prominent versions for realist arguments based on inference to the best explanation on the background of the bad lot objection (originating in van Fraassen). Second, I show a problem for such anti-realism that rests on very high epistemic standards.
What is Teleological Epistemology? (under review)
The incorporation of value theories in epistemology sparked a discussion about teleological epistemology and epistemic consequentialism. When compared to normative ethics, however, the main concepts of the debate are often used very loosely, have divergent meanings, or are even straight up confused. The debate urgently needs to have its primary concepts clarified. The aim of this paper is twofold. The first part develops a functional taxonomy around the concepts teleology, deontology, and consequentialism. This will be achieved by drawing the correct analogies from normative ethics to epistemology. In the second part, I argue that this taxonomy alone can already be a useful tool as a reply to widely held criticisms of teleological epistemology, such as epistemic trade-off objections. It can also help not to be misled by some analogies from ethical consequentialism.
It is Truth After All (in preparation)
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate of epistemic goals by defending T-Monism against the knowledge goal and Meno type objections. I start by arguing that the knowledge goal is best spelled out as a version of K-Pluralism. I proceed in pointing to the flaws of current arguments against K-Pluralism. Subsequently, I analyze an argument by David that could be successful against K-Pluralism but argue that it would undercut T-Monism as well. I then put forward a new defense of T-Monism, showing that the idea of justification adding something of value to true believing is based on a flawed intuition.
Against the Anti-Realist Aim of Science (in preparation)
I apply a veritist perspective to the epistemological realism debate and argue that common explications of the aims of science by anti-realists (as traditionally found in van Fraassen and Laudan) are defective. Specifically, for anti-realists to restrict the aims of science to observables based on the claim that the realist aims are unachievable is shown to be nested in flawed reasoning. I argue that participants in the realism debate should adopt an epistemology that sees our epistemic activities as searching for a trade-off between believing truths and avoiding error and not in terms of an achievement of first-order or second-order knowledge. I then present how anti-realists need to shift their argumentative strategies to get out of my charges. I conclude with an emergence of a kind of voluntarism that grows out of the proposed epistemological analysis of the realism debate.
I just recently finished my Ph.D project where I connect veritistic teleological epistemology with the epistemological scientific realism debate in philosophy of science. The goal is to break the stalemate of the realism debate. I argue that rival accounts depend largely on implicitly presupposed epistemic standards, which are constituted by a risk-attitude towards the trade-off between believing truth and avoiding error. The unshakable commitment to one’s risk attitude then explains the reoccurring stalemate of the debate. Subsequently, I employ three strategies to break the stalemate from the perspective of veritistic teleological epistemology, proposing some modifications to versions of classical realism (e.g. Boyd, Musgrave) and anti-realism (especially van Fraassen) as a response to moving the debate forward. I develop a new anti-realist position, and draw important consequences for various versions of selective realism. I conclude with an emergence of a kind of voluntarism that grows out of the proposed epistemological analysis of the realism debate.
Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, Epistemic Risk, and the Bad Lot (under review)
This paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological scientific realism debate in philosophy of science. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. Even though this suggest a liberal attitude towards stance choice (voluntarism), some arguments in the realism debate contradict VTE altogether. First, I show a problem with prominent versions for realist arguments based on inference to the best explanation on the background of the bad lot objection (originating in van Fraassen). Second, I show a problem for such anti-realism that rests on very high epistemic standards.
What is Teleological Epistemology? (under review)
The incorporation of value theories in epistemology sparked a discussion about teleological epistemology and epistemic consequentialism. When compared to normative ethics, however, the main concepts of the debate are often used very loosely, have divergent meanings, or are even straight up confused. The debate urgently needs to have its primary concepts clarified. The aim of this paper is twofold. The first part develops a functional taxonomy around the concepts teleology, deontology, and consequentialism. This will be achieved by drawing the correct analogies from normative ethics to epistemology. In the second part, I argue that this taxonomy alone can already be a useful tool as a reply to widely held criticisms of teleological epistemology, such as epistemic trade-off objections. It can also help not to be misled by some analogies from ethical consequentialism.
It is Truth After All (in preparation)
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate of epistemic goals by defending T-Monism against the knowledge goal and Meno type objections. I start by arguing that the knowledge goal is best spelled out as a version of K-Pluralism. I proceed in pointing to the flaws of current arguments against K-Pluralism. Subsequently, I analyze an argument by David that could be successful against K-Pluralism but argue that it would undercut T-Monism as well. I then put forward a new defense of T-Monism, showing that the idea of justification adding something of value to true believing is based on a flawed intuition.
Against the Anti-Realist Aim of Science (in preparation)
I apply a veritist perspective to the epistemological realism debate and argue that common explications of the aims of science by anti-realists (as traditionally found in van Fraassen and Laudan) are defective. Specifically, for anti-realists to restrict the aims of science to observables based on the claim that the realist aims are unachievable is shown to be nested in flawed reasoning. I argue that participants in the realism debate should adopt an epistemology that sees our epistemic activities as searching for a trade-off between believing truths and avoiding error and not in terms of an achievement of first-order or second-order knowledge. I then present how anti-realists need to shift their argumentative strategies to get out of my charges. I conclude with an emergence of a kind of voluntarism that grows out of the proposed epistemological analysis of the realism debate.
Talks
2022 Scientific Realism and Epistemic Risk
International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science, Technische Universität Berlin
2021 Scientific Realism and the Aims of Science and Epistemology
WIP Series, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2020 It is Truth After All
WIP Series, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2020 Three Strategies for Breaking the Stalemate of the Realism Debate Based on Veritistic Teleological Epistemology
PhD Seminar, London School of Economics, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
2019 A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification,
WIP Series, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2019 Teleological Epistemology as a Solution to the Scientific Realism Debate
Public Ph.D project presentation, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2018 Ein deterministischer Kosmos? Von der Aristotelischen Physik zur Quantenmechanik
[A Deterministic Kosmos? From Aristotelian Physics to Quantum Mechanics]
Interdisciplinary congress Zufall und Wissenschaft, Karl-Franzens University Graz
2016 Unbeobachtbare Entitäten in der Physik: Intuition, Anschaulichkeit und Common Sense
[Unobservable Entities in Physics: Intuition, Illustration and Common Sense]
Interdisciplinary congress Intuition und Wissenschaft, Karl-Franzens University Graz
2015 Die Rolle von Beobachtungssätzen in W.V.O. Quines Bestätigungsholismus
[The Role of Observation Sentences in W.V.O. Quine’s Confirmation Holism]
Lecture series Philosophische Perspektiven, Karl-Franzens University Graz, Department of Philosophy
International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science, Technische Universität Berlin
2021 Scientific Realism and the Aims of Science and Epistemology
WIP Series, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2020 It is Truth After All
WIP Series, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2020 Three Strategies for Breaking the Stalemate of the Realism Debate Based on Veritistic Teleological Epistemology
PhD Seminar, London School of Economics, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
2019 A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification,
WIP Series, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2019 Teleological Epistemology as a Solution to the Scientific Realism Debate
Public Ph.D project presentation, University of Salzburg, Department of Philosophy
2018 Ein deterministischer Kosmos? Von der Aristotelischen Physik zur Quantenmechanik
[A Deterministic Kosmos? From Aristotelian Physics to Quantum Mechanics]
Interdisciplinary congress Zufall und Wissenschaft, Karl-Franzens University Graz
2016 Unbeobachtbare Entitäten in der Physik: Intuition, Anschaulichkeit und Common Sense
[Unobservable Entities in Physics: Intuition, Illustration and Common Sense]
Interdisciplinary congress Intuition und Wissenschaft, Karl-Franzens University Graz
2015 Die Rolle von Beobachtungssätzen in W.V.O. Quines Bestätigungsholismus
[The Role of Observation Sentences in W.V.O. Quine’s Confirmation Holism]
Lecture series Philosophische Perspektiven, Karl-Franzens University Graz, Department of Philosophy